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Piotr Jakubów* / Agnieszka Malarewicz**
In an intensive care unit patients with breath inefficiency is given artificial ventilation
that allowed them to function normally. There is an insufficient number of home res-
pirators. When patient come back to his family the doctor can’t give them to all of
needed.
The duty of administering health services by doctors is both ethical and legal (law-
abiding). The doctor is obliged to provide help for ill people. By saying that, we un-
derstand helping directed on protecting patient’s life and help, or leading to ease their
pain. The abandonment of those duties by the doctor leads to various kinds of re-
sponsibilities, from which the most painful is the criminal responsibility. A series of
circumstances decides which responsibility the doctor will bear.
Analyzing the given actual state, undoubtedly it is important to show the legal
bases of the duty of giving health care by the doctors, the bases of responsibility for
not giving those services, and also the statutory resolves defining the patient’s rights.
This will allow answering the question: did the doctor allow to desist his duty by not
giving the respirators to people with breath efficiency, what kind of responsibility
does this hold and what are the consequences?
I. The legal duty of providing healthcare comes from the legal rule, which main
purpose is to protect human life and health, as goods being the basic value, from the
point of axiological law bases. Art. 68 of the Polish constitution says, that “it is every-
body’s right to have his health protected”, and “citizens, independently of their finan-
cial status are provided equal access, to healthcare by the authorities, financed with
public funds”. The source of the doctor’s duties is mainly art. 30 Of the doctor’s and
dentist’s profession law (dated Dec 5, 1996), according to which “the doctor has a duty
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of providing medical help, in every case, in which the delay in providing it could
cause a danger of life loss, heavy injuries or serious health disorder, or in other urgent
cases”. In the area of detailed laws it is also important to mention: –art 19 par.1 of the
health care institutions law from Aug 30 1991, in which the patient’s right to receive
“medical services responding to the requirements of medical knowledge, and in the
situations of limited possibilities (this situation exists in the title case) providing ade-
quate services to use reliable, based on medical criteria procedures setting the access
order to those services”, art 65 of the health care services financed from public funds
law from Aug 27 2004, stating that health insurance is based on the rules of “equal
treating and social solidarity, and providing the insured with equal access to the health
care services...” Also, the statements of “Doctor’s ethical cod” will have an important
meaning in this case, especially art.2 stating the solus aegroti suprema lex esto rule,
meaning “the patient’s well-being is the highest law” And so, the polish law provides
a wide area of rights in the healthcare and healthcare access area for all of the citizens.
Not delivering the duties given by the law on subjects that provide healthcare (first of
all by the doctors) causes legal responsibilities. And so, if the patient who needs help
in the meaning of providing healthcare services won’t get it in the adequate require-
ments of medical knowledge (in this case connecting to the respiration unit), then we
can say about not taking on the treatment by the doctoring the situation, when it was
necessary due to the state of the patient’s health.
II. The circumstance of the fundamental meaning for establishing the bases of
eventual doctor’s responsibility for abandoning providing the healthcare service is the
conclusion, if in this particular case the doctor was or wasn’t so called warrant of per-
son’s safety, which health or life was in danger. The doctor is that warrant only when
the legal duty of preventing negative consequences on life and health lays on him.
Most often, the source of the warrant’s function is taking the responsibility for the pa-
tient’s life willingly by the doctor. When the doctor’s duty isn’t the consequence of
that special relation connecting him with the person in need of help, we are dealing
with a general duty. Abandoning of this duty by the doctor causes a legal responsibili-
ty equal with other obligations, only for not committing that duty, regardless of the
following course of the events. The base of that responsibility is art 162 of penal
codex. *For the responsibility for the crime mentioned in art 162 we must deal with
three incoming circumstances: –the doctor must be aware of the dangers for the pa-
tient –despite of having this knowledge, he makes a decision not to give adequate
help to the patient –there was no special duty for taking care after this particular pa-
tient by the doctor. The legal responsibility for the doctor being a legal warrant of pre-
venting negative health consequences for the particular patient is differently shaped,
if, in connection with not providing healthcare, the patient suffered negative conse-
quences, or just was in a real risk state of suffering them. According to art. 2 “the pe-
nal responsibility for crimes committed by abandoning duties, lies also on the person
whose duty was to prevent the result” For determining in relation to the warrant doc-
tor the rule being the base of eventual penal responsibility, determining the health re-
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sult, which came out of abandoning by the doctor his duties will have the prior mean-
ing. We are talking here of the responsibility coming from art 160 par 2 and 3 of the
penal codex (exposing for direct danger of losing health or life). Those situations oc-
cur due to the doctor’s idleness accelerates the course of patient’s illness which, if tak-
en care of, wouldn’t cause a threat to his life. Undoubtedly important is for the doc-
tor’s responsibility in this case to determine the type of guilt. In the intentional guilt
(art 160 par 2) the doctor is aware of his role as a warrant for the endangered person,
also with a will of not giving the health service to the patient, also he agrees to the
fact, that by abandoning the service he exposes the patient to a direct danger of life or
health loss. Undoubtedly, it is hard to imagine that by his abandoning of the service
the doctor would want or agree to cause health loss, or even death (excluding eu-
thanasia, art 150). And so, in practice, we will most often deal with unintentional guilt
(art 160 par 3 penal codex), for example for unintentionally causing heavy health loss
(art 156 par 2 penal codex). The unintentional guilt takes place, when the warrant
doctor didn’t obey, in his behavior, the safety rules that were required in the specific
case and predicted, or could predict the consequences of those behaviors in the form
of endangering the patient. The above deliberations show, that doctor’s responsibility
for abandoning medical treatment is formed depending on the duty that lays on him
(the general or particular duty). The actual state, quoted at the beginning, points at a
situation, in which the doctor obliged to take care of the patients with breath disabili-
ties, decides to provide medical services just for some of them, and further decides to
abandon medical services to the rest of the patients. Thus comes a conclusion that the
doctor comes in a role of the warrant doctor, responsible for the patient’s health, for
who he obliged to provide medical service. So it could be said, that his responsibility
in the aspect of abandoning the treatment, which may lead to endangering patients to
negative medical consequences. If the doctor was aware, and above all had the will of
not providing the respirators for the patients, we can say that was a deliberate action.
This unethical proceeding leads to offense against the law and brings penal responsi-
bility on the doctor. Even if he acted unintentionally in that situation, that is, he did-
n’t have the will to endanger the patients, but he didn’t preserve the necessary pre-
cautions, his behavior doesn’t exclude his responsibility. From the practical reasons,
also with connection with the rules of doctor’s ethics, the second case appears to be
more possible to take place in the actual state of facts. That interfering the rules of
proper acting, taking precaution, coming from the medical arts, in providing the pa-
tients with the respirators, is a real reason for holding the doctor responsible. In the
case, when the number of patients suffering from breath disorders on a hospital ward
is much higher than the amount of available respirators, then the doctor, being the pa-
tient’s safety warrant, determines, using the medical criteria, the order of providing
this service. So, he must follow rules of safety accordingly to medical ethics and pro-
vided criteria.
III. The doctor’s actions, leading to abandoning the treatment, could also be a re-
sult of a lack of funding in the public institution of healthcare. There is no doctrine or
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judicial achievements in this matter, concerning the above deliberations, which seem
to have greater meaning mainly in the doctor’s duty cases. It is important to answer
the following question-could a rejection of providing medical treatment be a base of a
legally-penal charge, if for the sake of patients health that service is needed, and the
doctor denies basing on the reason, that all contracted services have been already
made? If we’re dealing with an urgent case, in the meaning of art. 30 of the doctor’s
and dentist’s profession law, then the doctor must provide help even when it is above
the contracted limit of medical services, of course within the particular institution’s
possibilities. If he doesn’t provide that service, he is exposed to the penal responsibil-
ity. This situation, when we are talking about an obligation conflict that is when, on
one hand the doctor is under the art. 30 of the doctor’s and dentist’s profession law, on
the second he is under the employer’s pression, who, when the payment can’t be as-
sured, orders the doctor to stop all activity. We are dealing here with a collision of two
obligations: the financial interest of a health care institution and the patient’s life or
health. This normalization orders to use adequate resolves in this case, dealing with a
higher necessity state, which sense is sacrificing one legal good to protect the other.
So the doctor shouldn’t be held responsible, if in an urgent situation he commits ac-
tions to save patient’s life and health, against the financial interests of his institution.
He sacrifices a good that is lower than saving peoples lives, what excludes illegalness
of his actions. *The other problem is a case when the patient’s state requires medical
care, but the case is not urgent. This issue requires recalling the law rules defining pa-
tient’s rights and the doctor’s duties, mentioned in art 68 par 2 of the polish constitu-
tion, or art 19 of the public healthcare institution law. So precising the constitution’s
resolve is mentioned in the public health insurance law (dated Feb 6 1997), which is
now replaced with the medical services financed from public funds law (Aug 27 2004).
According to art 65 of that law the health insurance is based on the rules of “equal
treatment and social solidarity”, and also “providing for the insured equal access to
healthcare services...” Reassuming, laws given above express in a single-meaning way
two rules, important for our deliberations: 1. the equal access to healthcare services
rule 2. A rule stating to establish an order of giving medical service based on medical
criteria in a situation of limited possibilities. The above arguments allow us to say that
every patient suffering in this case on breathe disorder has equal rights for acquiring a
respirator. But when the number of respirators is lower than the number of patients,
the duty of setting the order of access to them using the medical criteria lays on the
doctor, the law regulations don’t allow worse quality of service. And so in conclusion:
from the moment of taking up medical action on the particular patient the doctor has
the duty of behaving accordingly to his medical knowledge.
IV. The particular doctor’s actions take place in the conditions of a particular
health care institution. So if the lack of respirators doesn’t allow the doctor to face the
challenges of the actual state of knowledge, which also contains the situation where
the reason is the lack of institutional funds, then the responsibility for negative results
on the patient can’t be put on the doctor, which intervened. According to the Highest
PIOTR JAKUBÓW / AGNIESZKA MALAREWICZ
144 ANALES DE DERECHO, 6
Court opinion, the public healthcare service has a duty of including the average level
of medical services. HC advices that the estimations should be made carefully, be-
cause the medical and law factors are very closely connected with social factors. In its
opinion the standing rules give a base to say, that the right to protect the health was
and is limited, also from the financial reasons. So, really important matters are the
rules of setting the order of access to medical services, in the cases of limited access to
them. That order is now set basing only on medical-natured factors, what means that
the patient in a worse state should be provided with a medical service before a person
in a less serious state of health. Using this rule in reality isn’t a simple matter, it brings
a lot of doubts, mainly underlining the doctor’s role in taking those decisions. And so,
if the doctor gives out the respirators to the patients without maintaining the previ-
ously set order, then in the case when the negative health consequences appear in the
left-out patients, the penal responsibility lies on that doctor. The statement by An-
drzej Zoll, polish Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection, stating that doctor’s be-
havior breaks the law only when it’s directed against a law protected good, that is,
causes a danger for this good or leads to increase the existing endangering (he means
no neutralization or decreasing of existing endangering), seems to be true. Likewise
as in Poland, all over the world the doctor’s job is to protect the life and health of a
man. This duty is regulated in every country law system, and comes straight from
doctor’s ethics rules. Although, there are some cases, when the doctor didn’t provide
help for the patient, although a direct obligation of providing the patient with a spe-
cific health service. Even though cases like this take place in many countries, they are
a seldom subject of internal court adjudications, which focus mainly on doctor’s art
mistakes. Abandonment of treatment by doctors can take a form of passive euthana-
sia, that is abandonment of using therapeutic resources sustaining patient’s life (the
drugs, equipment), which leads to patient’s death. It takes place in a situation, when
the patient’s state is defined as terminal (that is the final state of life, a short period
leading straight and undoubtedly to death by complications being a result of a fatal ill-
ness. Abandonment of treatment on that patient leads to doctor’s responsibility, which
form and type lead to many doubts. How far is the doctor obliged to sustain the pa-
tient’s life, in what cases with passive behavior can’t we accuse him of murder or pe-
nal help refusal? Are there any boundaries like this at all? There is no single meaning
answer. It is impossible to define and precisely mention all of the cases, in which the
doctor can stop himself from life sustaining activities. Some boundaries must though
exist, considering mainly on the interest and suffering of the patient himself, his dig-
nity and autonomy. In reality, taking decisions about the course of doctor’s actions in
the terminal phase is extremely difficult. On the European ground, for example in
Denmark, the doctor can respect the patient’s decision and abandon the treatment, al-
though it is a facultative action. However, a dilemma already exists: can the undertak-
en treatment be abandoned, if it is the patient’s will. One thing, in the Dutch law, not
undertaking the treatment, to which the doctor is authorized depending on the pa-
tient’s will, and a different thing is actively acting in the form of abandoning the treat-
ment or disconnecting the medical gear. According to the documents of international
law, nobody’s life can be taken (art 6 of the Civil Pact, art. 3 General Human Rights
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Declaration, art. 4 American Human Rights Convention). Examples of a situation, in
which the doctor must take a decision of abandoning the treatment of a patient: the
patient suffers of artery occlusion, had a number of operations, the second patient is
suffering on past bronchia pneumonia and heart-failure; the treatment can only take
place on an intensive care ward. In that situation the doctor must place the patient on
such a ward, if there is no other option of sustaining his life. An older, even incurable
patient uses the right to be first, before the young patient, when it comes to placing
him on the intensive care ward. The international documents about the right to live
don’t leave the doctor any options, which of these patient’s has a greater right for the
intensive therapy (it is assumed that medical resources are limited), allowing to sus-
tain the life, because otherwise the fundamental rule banning discrimination would
be violated (art 14 of the European Human Rights Convention, Art 2. of the Civil
Pact, Art 1. The American Human Rights Convention). In the human rights interna-
tional law the difference between normal and special medical care resources wasn’t
codified, there are no definitions for neither of them. The question is-can we assume,
that using the reanimation gear on the patient being in a hopeless state, is an abuse of
therapeutic resources, till today is without an answer. The doctor’s responsibility for
abandoning the treatment and damages caused by his fault is shaped differently in
every other law system. In the USA the responsibility of the health service managing
subject is taken under consideration (HMO-Health Maintenance Organizations, PPO-
Preferred Provider Organizations, POS-Point of Service Plans, which play the role of our
medical institutions) for the damages caused by the fault of the general medicine doc-
tor. This responsibility is conditioned from the law relation, connecting the doctor
with the HMO, or other similar subject. If the doctor is an employee of a HMO, the
respondent superior is the base of his insurance responsibility. For using it, it is re-
quired, that between the doctor and HMO the dependency relation must exist, in the
shape that allows the superior (HMO, PPO, POS) to have control over the actions of
the subordinate. Most of the doctors, that provide private healthcare system services,
isn’t employed on the bases of job relation, gives them the status of independent ex-
ecutives, what though doesn’t exclude the service managing subject’s responsibility.
But the patient must show, that in the underwriter-doctor relation, the HMO could
have an influence on the behavior of the subject providing the service. If the doctor
was acting alone, the responsibility of the service managing subject is excluded. How-
ever, if the HMO could influence the doctor’s decision, the underwriter will bear the
responsibility on the implied agency theory. The inability of holding the underwriter
under civil responsibility based on the respondent superior or the implied agency the-
ory doesn’t automatically exclude the underwriter’s responsibility for the intentional
acts of independent carriers. If the doctor does his job independently, is free from the
HMO influence, the patient can only hold the underwriter responsible, basing on the
apparent agency rule. It has a use in all situations, in which the HMO causes reason-
able suspicion for the patient, that the doctor is an employee of a subject managing
medical services. In the case of Gilbert vs. Sycamore Municipal Hospital (156III.2d
511,1993), the court found, that the doctor on an intensive care ward duty is in his
eyes an employee of a hospital, which means that he could be taken for responsibility
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under the apparent agency theory. Reassuming, the doctor is obliged to provide med-
ical services, if the service is used to cure illness, save life or health, or ease the pain.
The way of providing the service must be corresponding with doctor’s art rules, estab-
lished by knowledge and experience. These rules should be above the penal law, con-
necting the abandonment of the treatment with penal consequences. The ethical
norms, bounding the doctor, are the signs for his conscience and fundaments for mak-
ing the right decisions.
Tab Date of children introduced to home ventilation
Birth date Kind of disease ICU income Start home vent. Lifes
1981 neuro-musculare dystrophy 1994 2000 y
1989 neuro-musculare dystrophy 1998 2002 y
1986 neuro-musculare dystrophy 1992 – no
1987 peipherial polineurophathy 1997 2000 y
1985 peipherial polineurophathy 1990 – no
1984 peipherial polineurophathy 1989 – no
1998 periphrial polineurophathy 2000 2001 y
1985 respirat. failure during spinal trauma 2002 2003 y
1984 respirat. failure during metabolic disease 1988 – no
1999 respirat. failure during metabolic disease 1999 2001 y
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